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COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS OF THE
COMMUNITY PATENT
JÉRÔME DANGUY AND 
BRUNO VAN POTTELSBERGHE DE LA POTTERIE
Highlights
• The European Union patent system is highly fragmented,
which reduces its effectiveness and attractiveness,
particularly through its prohibitive costs, its high degree of
uncertainty and the incongruities it generates.
• The Community Patent (COMPAT) would offer a coherent and
attractive patent system for a market of 500 million
inhabitants.
• According to the simulations, the COMPAT would drastically
reduce the relative patenting costs for applicants while
generating more income for the European Patent Office
(€43 million) and increased savings for the business sector
(€250 million).
• Most national patent offices would also see an increase in
their revenue, with the exception of Germany, which
presently benefits from the current system’s bias in favour
of large countries.
• The loss of economic rents (€400 million for patent
attorneys, translators and lawyers specialised in patent
litigation) and the reduction in the controlling power of
national patent offices provide explanations for the
observed resistance to the Community Patent.
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Abstract: For more than 40 years, governments and professional associations 
have acted, voted or lobbied against the implementation of the Community 
Patent (COMPAT). The econometric results and simulations presented in this 
paper suggest that, thanks to its attractiveness in terms of market size and a 
sound  renewal  fee  structure,  the  COMPAT  would  drastically  reduce  the 
relative patenting costs for applicants while generating more income for the 
European Patent Office and most national patent offices. The loss of economic 
rents  (€400  million  would  be  lost  by  patent  attorneys,  translators  and 
lawyers)  and  the  drop  of  controlling  power  by  national  patent  offices 
elucidate further the observed resistance to the Community Patent. 
JEL Classification: O34, 038, P14 
Keywords: patent systems, community patent, patenting cost, renewal fees, 
maintenance rate. 
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1  A fragmented European patent system 
From  a  “European  Union”  perspective,  the  European  patent  system  is  highly 
fragmented. It is actually a sum of 27 national patent systems. The only centralized 
dimension  corresponds  to  the  patent-granting  procedure,  composed  of  performing 
search  reports,  ensuring  publication  in  due  time,  and  performing  substantive 
examinations  and  processing  operations,  which  are  all  performed  by  the  European 
Patent Office (EPO) on behalf of 35 member states. Once a patent is granted it must be 
upheld,  managed  and  enforced  at  the  national  level.  This  ‘national’  stage  includes 
several validation and maintenance costs (frequent compulsory intermediation of local 
patent attorneys, validation fees, translation costs, renewal fees, litigation costs) that 
are essentially country-specific1. 
This fragmentation, which does not occur in other large economies like China, Japan or 
the USA, reduces the effectiveness and attractiveness of the European patent system, 
particularly through its prohibitive costs and the economic incongruities it generates. 
van Pottelsberghe and Mejer (2009), for instance, simulate the cost reductions induced 
by the London Agreement (which reduced the translation requirements of a patent’s 
“description” section in 14 signatory countries). But the 30 percent drop in cumulated 
costs due to the London Agreement (if only six countries are targeted for protection) 
should  not  overshadow  the  still  prohibitive  costs  of  patenting  in  Europe,  in  both 
absolute and relative terms. A patent enforced in ‘only’ six countries costs at least four 
times more than a patent filed in any other large economies. With renewal fees and 
translation costs that increase linearly with the geographical scope for protection, a 
patent targeting a large number of European countries can be up to 15 times more 
expensive than a US patent for instance. These prohibitive costs indubitably affect the 
                                                        
1 The patenting process can be more complex, as various routes can be taken to be protected in one or 
several  European  countries  (see  Guellec  and  van  Pottelsberghe  (2007)  for  a  detailed  description, 
especially  Chapter  1  and  Chapter  6).  van  Pottelsberghe  (2009)  shows  that  national  patent  systems 
actually  have  the  ultimate  power  to  validate  or  invalidate  a  patent,  as  they  still  grant  patents 
independently from – and sometimes in opposition to – the EPO. In other words, even the examination 
process is not fully centralized, as it is possible to leapfrog the EPO via parallel applications at NPOs. 3 
 
demand for patenting and reduce the accessibility to the system for small- and medium-
size firms (SMEs).2  
The negative effect of the fragmented system actually goes far beyond the prohibitive 
cost  of  patenting.  Mejer  and  van  Pottelsberghe  (2009)  show  that  heterogeneous 
national  litigation  expenses  and  practices  induce  a  high  level  of  uncertainty,  easier 
‘parallel imports’3, and a de facto paradox of having an EU-level competition policy and 
examination  process  (performed  by  the  EPO),  while  having  national  jurisdiction 
supremacies on patent issues. In this respect, the implementation of the Community 
Patent  (COMPAT)  would  not  only  reduce  costs  but  would  also  improve  the 
attractiveness and the effectiveness of the system, especially if it is associated with a 
unified European patent litigation agreement (EPLA).4 
A natural question that therefore arises is why the COMPAT5 has not been implemented 
so far? Why is it still under heavy negotiation despite all of the expected positive impact 
it would have on the European patent system? Many influential actors or lobby groups 
have  actually  been  effective  in  barring  the  way  to  the  COMPAT.  Among  them  are 
lawyers specialized in patent litigations, patent attorneys, and translators.6 In addition, 
some countries would like to see more languages than the three official ones (English, 
German and French).  
                                                        
2  Cf.  de  Rassenfosse  and  van  Pottelsberghe  (2007,  2008,  2009),  Harhoff  et  al  (2007,  2009)  and  van 
Pottelsberghe and François (2009). In short, the prohibitive costs of acquiring a European patent induce 
a smaller demand for patents filed at the EPO. 
3 The principle of free movement of goods in the EU makes it relatively easy for imitators, infringers or 
parallel  importers  to  enter  the  European  Union  through  a  country  where  the  patent  has  not  been 
enforced,  and  then  distribute  it  widely  within  Europe  including  the  countries  where  the  patent  is 
enforced. 
4  Harhoff  (2009)  puts  forward  a  cost-benefit  analysis  of  the  implementation  of  a  unified  European 
litigation system for patent issues. 
5 In addition to what is said in the main text, the other key elements of the Community Patent are the 
accession of the European Commission (EC) to the European Patent Convention (EPC) and the adoption 
of an EC Regulation on the COMPAT (Félix, 2009). Reality bites: we are still in negotiation mode with a 
draft agreement and statute for a new Unified Patent Litigation System, draft Council Conclusions on the 
patent reform project, and a revised Proposal for a Council Regulation on the COMPAT. 
6  Multiple  parallel  litigations  and  the  monitoring  of  translation  requirements  secure  real  ‘business’ 
opportunities for patent attorneys and lawyers. For translators the COMPAT would be associated with 
much less translation requirements and a sharp increase in the reliance on machine translations. Under 
the COMPAT and a centralized litigation process, a high quality translation would have to be paid by the 
owner of the patent only if a litigation occurs. All patent applications would have their claims translated 
into the official EPO languages. These translations would be run through a “machine” (or software) 
translations tool run by a new EPO department. 4 
 
Last but not least is the position of national patent offices (NPOs) and the EPO, which 
naturally strive to survive and tend to resist to a project that may drastically change 
their working environment, and especially their budget. The current system offers a 
win-win  situation  between  the  EPO  and  all  NPOs,  as  half  of  the  renewal  fees  on 
European patents received by NPOs are redirected towards the EPO.7 A natural “fear” – 
and logical question – is therefore to assess whether the COMPAT would reduce the 
renewal fee income of the NPOs and of the EPO. The EPO’s income is an important issue 
at stake, because about 25 percent of its budget is composed of the renewal fees income 
generated by the NPOs, and this ratio seems to be decreasing. This budgetary issue has 
operational consequences and must therefore be properly addressed. 
The  objective  of  this  paper  is  precisely  to  assess  what  would  be  the  budgetary 
consequences of the COMPAT. Providing an answer requires simulations, as the renewal 
fees receipts of a given country – generated by a current European patent – depend on 
three main factors: the average validation rate of a European patent in the country, its 
maintenance rate over time, and the level of renewal fees. The latter variable is the only 
exogenous variable, whereas the two former ones depend on many factors. The chosen 
simulation methodology aims at comparing the renewal fees’ receipts of an average 
European patent (under the current system) with the renewal fees’ receipts generated 
by an average patent under the COMPAT.   
The  econometric  results  and  simulations  suggest  that  with  a  sound  renewal  fee 
structure,  the  COMPAT  could  generate  more  income  for  the  European  Patent  Office 
(EPO) and for – nearly – all national patent offices (NPO) than under the current status 
quo. It would at the same time substantially reduce the relative patenting costs for 
applicants. The loss of economic rents (€400 million would be lost by patent attorneys, 
translators and lawyers) and the drop of controlling power by national patent offices 
elucidate further the observed resistance to the Community Patent. 
The  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  Section  2  introduces  the  reasoning  behind  the 
simulations  and  describes  the  econometric  model  that  aims  at  understanding  the 
determinants of the maintenance rate of patents. It then simulates the renewal fees’ 
                                                        
7 The renewal fees budget generated by European patents in each country are split into two shares: 50% 
for the EPO and 50% is included in the budget of the NPO. The 2008-2009 crisis has induced a sharp 
drop in renewals, which has led to a significant reduction of the EPO’s renewal fees income. 5 
 
income that would be generated by an average patent under the COMPAT. Section 3 
analyzes  the  implications  for  the  patent  offices,  provided  half  of  the  renewal  fees 
receipts generated by the COMPAT are directed towards the NPOs’ budgets and the 
other half is for the EPO.  The implications of the COMPAT on relative patenting costs 
are illustrated in section 4. Section 5 presents the total economic effects of the COMPAT 
for  the  most  important  actors  of  the  system.  Section  6  concludes,  discusses  the 
limitations of the results and underlines their policy implications.  
 
2  Simulations of renewal fees’ income 
With  the  current  system,  the  NPOs  retrocede  50%  of  their  renewal  fee  income 
generated  by  European  patents  to  the  EPO and  keep  the  other  half  for  themselves. 
Unfortunately NPOs rarely publish the importance of European patents for their yearly 
income, probably because it accounts for the lion’ share, the rest being generated by 
national patents. According to the EPO 2008 financial statements (p.34), € 654 Million 
was generated by renewal fees (€327 for the EPO and the same amount for the NPOs). 
Relying on the observed distribution key (cf. Appendix Table F), the German patent 
office earned about €103 Million, and the French and UK patent offices had revenues of 
about €40 Million.  As the 2008 annual report of the UKPO claims that the revenues 
generated by patents are of €49 Million (£39 Million), it can easily be deducted that 
national patents generate about €9 Million, or 23% of their total income. 
With  the  COMPAT  there  would  be  a  centralized  collection  of  renewal  fees,  most 
probably at the EPO. The EPO would then have to ‘share’ (assuming a status quo in the 
sharing of renewal fee income) the revenue generated by the COMPAT with the NPOs, 
with an appropriate distribution key between NPOs. The natural resistance of (some) 
NPOs is related to the belief that they would see a drop in their revenue: this ‘share’ 
might be smaller than the amounts currently collected as ‘independent offices’, with the 
maintenance of European patents in each chosen (six on average) national jurisdiction. 
Whether  this  ‘shared’  revenue  would  be  larger  or  smaller  than  the  local  revenue 
generated today with the traditional European patent is an issue that can be analyzed 6 
 
with simulations. The answer is not straightforward, as the total renewal fees income 
generated by the forthcoming COMPAT depends on three broad factors:  
￿  the renewal fee structure of the COMPAT (what level of renewal fees? It is clear 
that with very high fees there would be a relatively small use of it, and  vice 
versa);  
￿  the maintenance rate over time (which depends on the level of renewal fees and 
on  other factors; 
￿  the distribution key (how would the total renewal fees’ income generated by the 
COMPAT be shared between NPOs?). 
The methodological approach adopted to simulate the impact of the COMPAT on the 
renewal fees income of each NPO and of the EPO is composed of five main stages:  
S1.  Compute  the  total  renewal  fees  income  generated  by  a  current  ‘average’ 
European patent in the 27 EU NPOs; 
S2.  Understand  the  factors  that  influence  the  maintenance  rate  of  patents  in 
national jurisdictions; 
S3. Select an ‘acceptable’ renewal fee structure for the COMPAT; 
S4. From the results of (S2) and the chosen fee structures of (S3), simulate the 
maintenance rate of the COMPAT; 
S5.  From  (S4)  and  (S3),  compute  the  renewal  fees’  income  generated  by  the 
COMPAT. 
The  simulations  are  performed  “at  the  patent  level”  to  make  the  conclusions 
independent  from  the  relative  substitution  between  the  European  patent  and  the 
COMPAT, and independent from any hypothesis on the total number of patents granted 
by the EPO. Questions such as “what will be the share of patents granted by the EPO that 
follow  the  COMPAT  route?”  would  therefore  not  affect  the  results  (if  all  the  patents 
granted by the EPO opt for the current European patent, there would be no change to 
the  current  situation).  What  matters  is  therefore  the  difference  in  the  renewal  fees 
revenues generated by an average European patent and by an average COMPAT. The 
cumulated renewal fees’ income generated by one current European patent over its 7 
 
entire life span depends on the number of countries it has been validated in, on the 
duration of the patent renewals in each of these countries – or its maintenance rate –  
and on the level of renewal fees. The total renewal fees’ income generated by all the 
NPOs of the EU27 member states and of the EPO is VNPO (as defined in equations (1) 
and (2) below, it measures the income generated by one European patent “on average” 
over its entire lifecycle). For an average patent under the COMPAT, the main dimensions 
that matters are its maintenance rate and its renewal fees (as there is only one choice, 
the validation rate is automatically 100%). The distribution key will then define the 
income for each NPO .8  
Three working hypotheses must be set before entering into the analysis. They are fairly 
acceptable and allow reducing the number of alternative dimensions that could be taken 
into  account  for  the  simulations.  First  is  the  hypothesis  of  “run-in-period”,  which 
suggests that the renewal fees’ income simulations are run “at equilibrium”. The early 
changes in patenting behavior, and the required adaptation time to the new system are 
therefore not accounted for. This hypothesis is equivalent to the practice that consists in 
considering the long run equilibrium of incoming flows of renewal fees, over the entire 
lifetime of patents. 
The  second  working  hypothesis  is  that  any  patent  starts  to  generate  renewal  fees 
income  for  NPOs  from  its  6th  year  onwards  (up  to  its  20th  year,  depending  on  its 
maintenance rate). Before that, it is considered as a ‘pending’ application at the EPO. 
This hypothesis corresponds to the observed average delay before the decision to grant 
a patent at the EPO.9 
The third working hypothesis is the irreversibility choice that must be made by the 
applicant (remember that the two systems would co-exist). Once a patent is granted by 
the EPO, the applicant must chose between the current European patent format and the 
COMPAT. If an applicant opts for the latter it is not possible to later switch back towards 
the current European patent system, and vice versa. Allowing such a ‘switching’ system 
                                                        
8 Cf. appendix A for a synthesis of the main factors explaining the renewal fees income under the two 
regimes (European patent and the community patent). 
9 Lazaridis and van Pottelsberghe (2007) and van Zeebroeck (2008), between others, provide evidence on 
this average duration. 8 
 
would simply induce a high complexity in both the simulation exercise and the tracking 
of what is actually going on in Europe. 
These three working hypotheses (run-in-period, 6th year grant, irreversible choice) and 
the patent-level methodological choice aim at assessing whether an average community 
patent  (COMPAT)  would  generate  more  or  less  revenues  than  a  current  average 
European  patent  (EP)  over  its  entire  life  span.  Whatever  the  substitution  degree 
between these two patents is, an actor (national patent office or the EPO) will be better 
off if the revenue it gets from one average COMPAT is higher than what he gets from one 
average European patent. 
S1. Compute the total renewal fees income generated by an ‘average’ European 
patent in the 27 EU NPOs 
 
For the national patent office of a country i, the renewal fees’ income generated by a 
European patent depends on three main factors: 
-  The validation rate: the probability that the patent is validated in country i ; 
-  The maintenance rate: the probability that it is maintained each year t  for a 
maximum of 20 years ; 
-  The level of renewal fees. 
Equation (1) shows the total renewal fees’ income (VNPOi) generated by an average 
European patent in the national patent office of country i: 
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ∑ ￿￿ 
￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿                (1) 
Where:  ￿￿ = The share of patents granted by the EPO which are validated in country i 
  ￿￿￿ = The drop-out (or depreciation) rate of the average patent in country i and 
year t (i.e. the percentage of patents which are not renewed in the country) 
   ￿￿￿ = The renewal fees in country i and year t  
According  to  equation  (1),  the  budgetary  value  of  an  average  European  patent  for 
country i is the sum from year 6 to year 20 (the maximum duration period) of the 
product of the validation rate (or validation probability), the maintenance rate (1-δ) 
and the level of the renewal fees. This amount can be divided by 2, as half of the revenue 
generated by an NPO is going back to the EPO and the other half is for the NPO itself 9 
 
(this 50/50 split will be accounted for in individual NPOs revenue simulations). Year 6 
of the patent is taken into account for the start of the renewal fees’ income computation. 
Adding the cumulated renewal fees’ income generated by the 27 member states of the 
European Union, as in equation (2), gives the total income (VNPO) generated by an 
average European patent over its life in the national patent offices of the European 
Union (and for the EPO). 
￿￿￿￿ ￿ ∑ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿
￿￿￿                    (2) 
The value of a patent under the COMPAT can be measured with a similar formulae, with 
the exception that it is by definition associated with a validation rate equal to 100% (the 
COMPAT only has one ‘validation’ possibility, otherwise it is not a ‘COMPAT’). The total 
income generated by an average patent under the COMPAT (VCOM) is presented in 
equation (3).  
￿￿￿￿ ￿ ∑  ￿1 ￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿                (3) 
The major parameters are the maintenance rate of the COMPAT (1-δc) and the structure 
of its renewal fees. The former parameter obviously depends on the latter: very high 
fees would reduce the maintenance rate (or increase the drop-out rate). The parameter 
(π)  related  to  the  probability  of  validation  has  disappeared  because  selection  the 
COMPAT route does not lead to any subsequent choice, there is only ‘one’ COMPAT 
route,  as  illustrated  in  Figure  1.  It  compares  the  procedural  routes  followed  by  a 
European Patent and the COMPAT. First of all, it should be noticed that a small part of 
the current patents granted by the EPO are never validated in any country and fall into 
public domain as soon as the decision to grant is made by the EPO (Lazaridis and van 
Potteslberghe,  2007  estimated  this  share  at  10%).  These  ‘lapsed’  patents  do  not 
generate any revenue in terms of validation or renewal fees, and are therefore not taken 
into account. As we work at the patent level (how much renewal fee revenue would be 
generated  by  one  European  patent  or  one  COMPAT),  early  lapses  do  not  affect  the 
current simulations.  
Once a patent is granted, the inventor would choose between the European patent and 
the COMPAT. In the former case, he would have to validate the patent in all desired  
NPO’s  and  pay  the  translation  cost
translations  would  be  taken  in  charge  by  the  EPO
translations). After the grant
renewal fees (domestic renewal fees at
schedule for the COMPAT route
Figure 1 – Procedural routes of European patent and 
Figure  2  illustrates  the  differences  observed  across  countries  in  the 
validation/maintenance rates
large  homogenous  economy  and  relatively  low  renewal  fees  has  the  highest 
maintenance rate all along the life span of a patent. Within Europe, Germany, by far the 
largest and the richest country
the US or Japanese one. After six years, 85 per cent of the patents granted by the EPO 
are enforced in Germany. This rate falls to 18 per cent for the patents aged 20 year.
Finland, a smaller country, has much smaller validation
cent of the granted patents, which falls to about 1 per cent after 20 years. 
                                                       
10 For European countries the product of validation and maintenance rates is presented in the graph. The 
maintenance rates taken separately are pictured for a few European countries in appendix Figure D1.
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the grant, patents are maintained through the payment of yearly 
domestic renewal fees at NPOs for the European patent a
he COMPAT route). 
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illustrates  the  differences  observed  across  countries  in  the 
lifetime10. Japan, with a 
large  homogenous  economy  and  relatively  low  renewal  fees  has  the  highest 
maintenance rate all along the life span of a patent. Within Europe, Germany, by far the 
has high validation/maintenance rates, similar to 
the US or Japanese one. After six years, 85 per cent of the patents granted by the EPO 
are enforced in Germany. This rate falls to 18 per cent for the patents aged 20 year. 
 rates, about 5 per 
cent of the granted patents, which falls to about 1 per cent after 20 years.  
For European countries the product of validation and maintenance rates is presented in the graph. The 
n separately are pictured for a few European countries in appendix Figure D1. 11 
 
Figure 2 – Validation/Maintenance rates of patents in selected countries 
 
 
Source: own calculation from data provided by the EPO and NPOs and trilateral statistical report, see 
Appendix B and Appendix Table C for data source and computation. 
 
The fact that Finland has a much smaller validation and maintenance rate than Belgium 
might as well be due to its particularly high renewal fees, which are nearly twice as high 
as in Belgium (cf. appendix Table E). The simultaneous role of economic size and fees, 
amongst other variables, is evaluated in the next subsection. The maintenance rate for 
the US is dented because renewal fees must only be paid at three different stages in the 
life of a patent, confirming somewhat the important role played by renewal fees. From 
Figure  2  it  is  important  to  bear  in  mind  that  strong  variations  in 
maintenance/validation  rates  are  observed  across  countries,  and  that  the  share  of 
active patents continuously drops over time.   
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S2. Understand the  factors that influence the maintenance rate of  patents in 
NPOs 
The maintenance rates presented in Figure 2 are a key factor for the calculation of the 
total revenue generated by one patent (for a given NPO or for Europe as a whole). 
Therefore, in order to simulate the revenue generated by an average patent under the 
COMPAT, the factors that affect the observed maintenance rates must be understood 
and measured. 
The  model  adopted  to  grasp  the  determinants  of  maintenance  rate  is  designed 
according to the existing literature, logical considerations and intense interactions with 
national  patent  offices  and  patent  professionals.  The  earliest  paper  that  focuses  on 
renewal  data  of  European  patents  is  probably  the  one  by  Schankerman  and  Pakes 
(1986), who rely on renewal data to approximate the distribution of patent value and its 
depreciation rate. Several others studies (Cornelli and Schankerman (1999) and Baudry 
and Dumont (2009)) argue and provide evidence that renewal fees have an impact on 
the decision to patent and to maintain a patent in force.  Harhoff et al. (2008 and 2009) 
assess the determinants of validation behavior (at the aggregate country level and at the 
patent level) within the European patent system, with a particular focus on market size, 
distance between countries, validation fees, early renewal fees and translation costs. 
van Zeebroeck (2008, 2009) investigates the strategic factors that affect the duration 
(or maintenance rate) of patents within Europe, with a patent-based approach. The 
author shows that European patents are validated in fewer countries over time but for a 
longer time frame. This duration is partly influenced by strategic factors, including the 
filing strategies adopted by applicants.  
The model adopted in the present paper contributes to the literature by providing a first 
evaluation  of  the  impact  of  renewal  fees  and  other  country-specific  factors  on  the 
aggregate maintenance rate of patents across countries. The model is performed with a 
database composed of 15 European countries, the USA and Japan. The empirical model 
is presented in equation (4): 
￿1 ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ! "￿"￿ ￿ # ￿￿$￿￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿￿￿ ￿ &￿￿      (4) 
The  dependent  variable  corresponds  to  the  average  maintenance  rate  of  granted 
patents ((1-δ), or one minus the drop-out rate) enforced in country i at year t (t=6,…, 13 
 
20). In other words, it is the share of patents that are renewed as a percentage of the 
total number of patents of the same cohort that were validated in the country. Fifteen 
years of renewals are therefore taken into account for each country. This variable is 
computed from the most recent information for each age-year of a patent (see appendix 
B for a description of the methodology). For instance, the maintenance rate for the 20th 
year is taken for the patent cohort of 1987 (i.e., all patent filed in 1987 by the EPO) as 
the information for more recent cohorts is not yet available. The maintenance rate for 
the 10th year is taken from the cohort of 1997, and so on. This 20 years ‘lag’ for the 2Oth 
year of maintenance rate will probably change over time but is the only available and 
reliable information.  
The country-level explanatory variables include the gross domestic product (GDP)11 in 
2006, expressed in €; an indicator of the strength of the national patent system (IPI, 
which is computed by Ginarte and Park (1997) and updated by Park (2008)); and the 
age of membership of the country in the EPC (NPOAGE, going up to a maximum of 31 
years  for  the  founding  members).  This  latter  variable  aims  at  testing  whether  the 
countries  that  have  been  part  of  the  EPC  for  a  longer  period  also  have  higher 
maintenance  rates,  thanks  to  a  learning  and  adaptive  process.  The  age  of  a  patent 
(PATAGE) is a variable that is constant across countries but varies over time to capture 
the life cycle of the patented technology. It is expected that the older a patent (hence the 
technology) is, the lower is its maintenance rate.  Finally, one variable varies across 
countries and over the life cycle of a patent: the renewal fees (F). They are expected to 
have a negative impact on the maintenance rate. Table 1 provides summary statistics of 
the database. The sample of 17 countries was chosen over a larger sample because of 
data availability (there are currently 27 countries within the EU). As many countries 
have only recently joined the EPC, only small periods were available, with high standard 
deviations over time. Taking the 15 oldest EU member countries, added to Japan and the 
USA, allows to assess the long term determinants of relatively ‘stable’ maintenance rate. 
It is worth noticing that including more countries in the panel did not change the results 
(results are available upon request). The maintenance rates are presented in appendix 
table C.  
                                                        
11 As indicator of the size of countries, population was also tested and the econometric results were 
similar. 14 
 
Table 1 - Summary statistics of the database 
      Min  Mean  Max  S.D. 
Maintenance rates (%)  t=6  39  63  100  21 
t=10  28  49  90  19 
t=15  14  28  65  14 
   t=20  8  13  33  7 
GDP (in billion €)  34  1,463  10,496  2,526 
Age of membershipa  12  26  31  7 
Fees (€)b  t=6  59  115  188  40 
   t=10  118  285  902  195 
t=15  190  512  1,060  273 
   t=20  270  770  1,940  442 
IPI  4.14  4.55  4.88  0.19 
a. For Japan and the USA, we assumed the same age of membership as the oldest EPC member states 
b. The US fees must only be paid at three different stages in the life of the patent (€776 at 9th year,  
     €1,964 at 13th year and €3,256 at 17th year) 
Source: raw data provided by the EPO and NPOs, trilateral statistical report, Eurostat and Park (2008); 
see appendixes C and E for further details. 
 
The econometric results are presented in Table 212; they can be interpreted as follows. 
First, GDP, which reflects the market attractiveness or the wealth of a country, has a 
positive and highly significant impact on the maintenance rate. The countries with a 
higher GDP enjoy a higher maintenance rate. Looking at the standard errors, one may 
conclude  that  GDP  is  one  of  the  two  most  important  factors  that  influence  the 
maintenance rate of European patents in a country. The second variable that plays a 
very significant role is the age of the patent. Its level of significance is as high as the level 
of significance of the GDP variable. The older a patent is, the lower its maintenance rate. 
This is true for all countries and follows the natural life cycle of a patented technology. 
Then comes a country’s age as member of the EPC. The estimated parameter suggests 
that the longer the EPC membership, the higher the maintenance rate of a patent. This is 
the illustration of an adaptation phase to an advanced European system. de Rassenfosse 
and van Pottelsberghe (2007) also find that the ‘older’ EPC member states transfer a 
higher  number  of  their  national  patent  applications  to  the  EPO.  The  Intellectual 
Property Index plays a positive and significant impact, suggesting that the countries 
                                                        
12 The same model was estimated by taking the log of GDP and the log of patent age; and lead to similar 
results. 15 
 
with a stronger patent system (in terms of subject matter, enforcement quality, and 
reliability) will logically see higher maintenance rates than the countries with weaker 
patent systems. 
 
Table 2  - Estimated parameters of the “maintenance rate” model13 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Intercept  0.229  ***  0.536  ***  -0.256 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.038) 
 
(0.207) 
GDP ( '000 billion €)  0.104  ***  0.072  ***  0.064  *** 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
Fees ('000 €)  -0.350  ***  -0.112  ***  -0.119  *** 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.027) 
 
(0.026) 
Age of membership  0.007  ***  0.007  ***  0.008  *** 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
Age of the patent  -0.030  ***  -0.029  *** 
     
(0.002) 
 
(0.002) 
Intellectual Property Index  0.172  *** 
         
(0.044) 
Adjusted R-Square (%)  53.9  74.1  75.6 
  Number of observations  243  243  243 
  Source: cf. equation (4) in main text. The parameters are estimated with an heteroscedastic consistent 
estimator, over 17 countries and 15 years (unbalanced panel). The dependent variable is the maintenance 
rate,  GDP  is  the  2006  gross  domestic  product;  Fees  stands  for  the  national  annual  renewal  fees 
(expressed in ‘000 €); Age of membership corresponds to the country’s date of signature for the EPC 
membership, Intellectual property index comes from Ginarte and Park (1997)’s updated results for 2005, 
Park (2008). *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively; standard errors 
are in parentheses. 
 
Finally,  a  country’s  renewal  fees  have  a  negative  and  significant  impact  on  the 
maintenance  rate  of  patents.  The  higher  the  renewal  fees,  the  lower  are  the 
maintenance rates in a country. This variable is highly significant, but less than the 
patent life cycle and GDP variables. A comparison of column (2) with column (1)  shows 
that a sharp drop in the impact of patent fees occurs when the patent age is included 
simultaneously with the fee variable. This is due to the correlation between the two 
variables. Most NPOs have fee schedules which systematically increase with patents’ 
age, witnessing the two forces that push a patent towards the public domain: time and 
costs.  
                                                        
13 These results differ slightly from those presented in  the report for the European Commission (DG 
Internal Market) because the data for Intellectual Property Index were updated. 16 
 
According  to  the  adjusted  R-square,  the  four  variables  explain  76  per  cent  of  the 
variance in maintenance rates over time and across countries, which is a fairly good 
approximation.14  
Two methodological caveats, or implicit hypotheses, are worth noticing. The first one is 
related  to  the  reliance  on  observed  (past)  maintenance  rates.  The  twenty  year 
maintenance rate of the patents granted today will most probably adapt to a different 
environment  and  might  be  smaller  or  higher  than  the  ones  observed  today  for  the 
patents granted 20 years ago. This issue is clearly embodied into the degree of quality of 
the system (quality of applications and rigor of the examination process). If a patent 
office grants many patents of dubious quality one may expect a smaller maintenance 
rate, and vice versa. In this respect, van Pottelsberghe and van Zeebroeck (2008) show 
that the average quality or value of patents granted by the EPO has constantly dropped 
over the past 20 years, which is synonymous to validations in less countries for smaller 
period of time. The second implicit hypothesis is that the system is stable and therefore 
the determinants of maintenance rates and validation rates observed nowadays will be 
the same for the COMPAT, which actually consists in setting up a new system.15  
S3. Select an ‘acceptable’ renewal fee structure for the COMPAT 
The renewal fees structure is an important policy leverage in practice, and more than a 
simple way to cover the operating costs of patent offices16.  Schotchmer (1999) argues 
that the renewal fees mechanisms works as a direct  revelation mechanism – of the 
private information owned by the applicant about his invention. Baudry and Dumont 
                                                        
14 Two alternative methodologies have been used to assess the robustness of these estimates. First, the US 
and Japan were withdrawn from the sample. The estimates run on 15 European countries lead to very 
similar parameters and significance levels (results are available upon request). An important change is 
the parameter associated with GDP, which was much higher with this reduced sample (0.15 instead of 
0.07). Since GDP is a key economic variable influencing the maintenance rate we decided to rely on the 
full sample for the simulations of the maintenance rate under the COMPAT, which is a conservative 
practice. The second test consisted in correcting the potential bias due to the fact that the dependant 
variable  fluctuates  between  0  and  1.  A  model  was  run  with  a  transformed  dependant  variable 
(y*=log(y/(1-y)) that fluctuates between minus infinite and plus infinite. All the estimated parameters 
were of the same sign and significance. 
15 For instance, the consequences of the London Agreement (cf. van Pottelsberghe and Mejer (2009), 
Harhoff  et  al.  (2009a,  2009b))  might  well  be  to  have  each  EPO  granted  patent  validated  in  more 
countries, which could affect the simulated impact of the COMPAT. 
16 In particular, Gans et al. (2004) examines how imposing a self-funding constraint to a patent office can 
create distortions in fees. 
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(2006) suggest that renewal fees can be used as a policy tool to discourage low-value 
patents and to promote the diffusion of innovation at the end of patent life. 
Different  structures  of  renewal  fees  can  be  considered  for  the  COMPAT.  Four 
alternatives  are  presented  in  Figure  3.  One  approach  consists  in  summing  up  the 
renewals fee of the 2 or 4 countries that are the most frequently designated under the 
current European patent system. They are respectively called VCOM(2) and VCOM(4). 
Such additive fee structure was proposed in the European Council working document 
(EC, 2008, DG Internal Market). The document also suggests that the COMPAT renewal 
fees could correspond to the sum of up to height countries’ current renewal fees.  
An  alternative  and  somewhat  simpler  renewal  fees  schedule  can  be  put  forward.  It 
would be composed of a starting fee of €600 on year 6 of the patent age and then a 
constant increment of €200 or €300 (or more) each additional year in the patent age. 
These fee schedules are respectively named VCOM(200) and VCOM(300). The proposed 
VCOM(200) is actually close to the sum of four countries’ renewal fees, or VCOM(4). 
These two fee schedules seem to be the most appropriate. Indeed, van Pottelsberghe 
and van Zeebroeck (2008) show that the average geographical scope of protection for a 
15 years old patent is of about 4 countries. Therefore the VCOM(200) or VCOM(4) fee 
structure correspond to what the business sector is currently paying.  With VCOM(200), 
the applicant would pay a fee of about €3,300 to keep a patent enforced on its 20th year, 
against about €900 in Japan and the US17. With VCOM(300) the amount would be close 
to €5,000. The cumulated fees over time with VCOM(200) would be of €5,000 for 10 
years and €30,000 for 20 years. An exponential version of the VCOM(200) fee schedule 
is also considered. This fee structure – called VCOM(200+) – is the same as VCOM(200) 
until the 15th year and then imposes a stronger increasing of fees (with €3,000 at year 
16, €4,000 at year 17, €5,000 at year 18, €6,000 at year 19 and €8,000 at year 20). 
 
                                                        
17 In the US a renewal fee of €3,256 must be paid on year 17 of the patent, which makes approximately a 
€800 per year from year 17 to year 20 (cf. appendix Table E). 18 
 
Figure 3 - Possible fee structures for the COMPAT 
 
Note: VCOM(2) and VCOM(4) correspond to the sum of the renewal fee structure of 2 and 4 countries, 
respectively. VCOM(200) and VCOM(300) characterize a fee structure that would start at €600 at year 6 
and then add each year €200 and €300, respectively.VCOM(200+) is the same as VCOM(200) till year 15 
and then increases exponentially to reach €8,000 at year 20. 
 
A  comparison  of  these  COMPAT  renewal  fee  schedules  with  the  fees  of  the  current 
European  patent  system  can  be  done  in  absolute  and  relative  terms  (cf.  van 
Pottelsberghe  and  François,  2009).  Indeed,  renewal  fees  might  be  twice  as  high  in 
country A as in country B, but if the former is four times larger than in the latter (i.e., 
with a much larger market potential), the relative fee is actually cheaper in country A 
than in country B. For instance, if the COMPAT would apply the ‘relative’ fee structure of 
the German patent office to the whole EU economic area, the renewal fees would be 
much higher. In fact, the German fees start very low and end up at about €2,000 at the 
end of the patent life cycle. If the same ‘relative’ fee (ie, same fee per capita or fee per 
GDP) is applied for the COMPAT, the renewal fee schedule would be quite prohibitive 
and reach €10,000 to €12,000 for the 20th year of protection. The renewal fee structure 
proposed  with  the  VCOM(300)  solution  would  ends  under  €5,000,  which  is  more 
affordable, but still more than twice as high as the absolute fee in Germany for the 20th 
year. Keeping in mind that the whole economic area covered by the COMPAT would be 
more than six time larger than the one currently covered by Germany, a VCOM(200) or 
VCOM(300) solution seems acceptable and corresponds to a good compromise between 
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an absolute and a relative fee schedule. A probably more convincing argument is related 
to what the business sector seems to be ready to pay. As mentioned here above, 15 year 
old  patents  are  on  average  maintained  in  four  countries,  which  corresponds  to 
VCOM(200).  International comparisons of absolute and relative fees will be addressed 
in section 4. 
S4. Simulate the maintenance rate of the COMPAT 
With the estimated parameters presented in column (3) of Table 2, and the potential fee 
schedules presented above, it is now possible to simulate maintenance rates for the 
future COMPAT (cf. eq. (4)).  The GDP of the EU27 economic area is straightforward to 
compute, the patent age is available as such, and the age of membership is supposed to 
be of 0 year (i.e. no experience, because it is a new system). It could be argued that an 
age of 30 years could be taken into account, because the 11 founding fathers account for 
a large economic area within the EU27. But this assumption would not substantially 
affect the simulations, and we opted for a conservative approach (so that the risk is to 
underestimate the revenues generated by the COMPAT). The only variable that might 
vary substantially, and is subject to ‘political’ negotiations, is the renewal fees structure 
of the COMPAT. 
The simulated maintenance rates under the COMPAT18 are pictured in Figure 4. They 
vary according to the chosen renewal fee structure. Most simulations fluctuate between 
the actual Japanese and German maintenance rates, and are above the latter all along 
the patent life cycle. This high maintenance rate of the COMPAT is primarily due to the 
large geographical scope that would be covered by a single patent, which is more than 
five times larger than the German economy. Lower renewal fees, like VCOM(200) would 
logically induce a higher maintenance rate. The negative impact of fees is illustrated by 
the VCOM(200+) curve which decreases significantly from year 16 (corresponding to 
the  exponential  increase  of  renewal  fees  comparatively  to  the  VCOM(200))19.  In 
addition, a worst case-scenario is also considered. It is arbitrary chosen with higher – 
                                                        
18 The represented maintenance rates are for an average COMPAT, it would be obviously higher for higher 
value patents. In the same vein, these simulations correspond to the scenario of patents of an average 
company. In reality, it is clear that some companies (electronic industry for example) actually validate 
their patent in only 2-3 countries whereas other industries do it everywhere (see van Pottelsberghe and 
van Zeebroeck, 2008). 
19 The simulated maintenance rate of VCOM(200+) was restricted at 10% for the last two years since it is 
generally accepted that at least 10% of patents stay in force for 20 years, whatever the level of fees. 20 
 
particularly  in  the  first  years  of  the  patent  life  –  drop-out  rate  than  the  simulated 
COMPAT ones. 
Figure 4 - Simulated maintenance rate with the COMPAT 
 
The simulated maintenance rates for the COMPAT were normalized to 1 at the 6th year. The series for the  
Japan and Germany are actual series. The curve labeled ‘worst’ corresponds to a worst case scenario, with 
a high and fast drop-out rate. Source: own calculation from EPO data and the Trilateral statistical report 
for the US and Japan, and from the estimated parameters presented in Table 2 (column 3) and in equation 
(4).  
 
S5. Compute the renewal fees’ income generated by the COMPAT 
With the simulated ‘maintenance rates’ of the COMPAT it is now possible to calculate 
the  renewal  fee  income  that  would  be  generated  by  an  average  patent  under  the 
COMPAT  and  compare  it  with  the  renewal  fee  income  generated  by  an  average 
European patent. Figure 5 presents the average total renewal fees income generated by 
one patent over its life time. The renewal fee income (VNPO) is calculated as in equation 
(2) and depends on the number of countries in which the patent has been validated in 
and on the number of years it is maintained in each of these countries. The higher the 
number of countries (amongst 27 possible countries within the EU) and the longer the 
maintenance of the patent (with a maximum of 20 years from the priority date), the 
higher is the total amount of renewal fees’ income generated by the patent. The first bar 
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(in grey) presented in Figure 5 corresponds to the actual fees income generated by a 
current European patent granted by the EPO, a bit more than €11,000. This ‘simulated’ 
number is actually close the observed renewal fees income observed in the NPOs and 
the EPO, which validates somewhat the approach adopted in this analysis.20 
The total renewal fees income generated by the COMPAT would obviously vary with the 
level  of  fees,  as  illustrated  in  equation  (3).  According  to  the  estimated  parameters 
presented in Table 2 (column 3) (and hence the simulated maintenance rate of the 
COMPAT depicted in Figure 4), the revenue generated by the COMPAT would vary from 
nearly  €10,000  with  the  VCOM(2)  renewal  fees  schedule  up  to  €13,600  with  the 
VCOM(4)  renewal  fees  schedule.  With  the  simpler  fee  schedule  put  forward  in  this 
paper,  it  would  vary  around  €16,000  (with  the  VCOM(200)  and  VCOM(300)  fee 
schedules). Higher fees do not necessarily correlate with a higher revenue, due to the 
negative and significant fee elasticity of patents. This is illustrated by the VCOM(200+) 
renewal fees schedule, which generates less revenues than VCOM(200): too high fees 
decrease the maintenance rate to such an extent that they do not compensate for the 
increase in the drop-out rate. Renewal fees have a real ‘dual’ impact on the revenues 
generated by patents for the EPO and the NPOs.  
The worst case-scenario maintenance rate was chosen arbitrarily as being lower than 
any observed maintenance rate in large countries (like Japan or Germany) and lower 
than the simulations based on the quantitative analysis. The VCOM(200+) renewal fee 
schedule  paired  with  this  ‘worst’  case  maintenance  rate  generate  about  the  same 
revenue as a current European patent. 
 
                                                        
20 Over the past 10 years the EPO has granted about 50,000 patents a year. Therefore, multiplying this 
number by the average renewal fee income generated by one patent (for the EPO it would be €5,600 or 
half €11,168 for VNPO in Figure 5) would yield a total revenue for the EPO of about €280 Million. 
According to the EPO 2008 financial statements (p. 34), the EPO had revenues from national renewal 
fees from previously granted patents of about €327 Million., which is not too far from the simulated 
revenues. 22 
 
Figure 5 - Simulated total renewal fees’ income under the COMPAT 
 
Source:  own  calculation  from  the  estimated  parameters  presented  in  Table  2,  observed  data  on 
maintenance rates in national patent offices (see appendix table C. and appendix D.), different structures 
of fees illustrated in Figure 3 and simulated maintenance rates of Figure 4. GERMAN(200+) corresponds 
to the observed German maintenance rate with the VCOM(200+) renewal fees schedule.  
 
In other words, the COMPAT would generate at least the same amount of cumulated 
fees’ income than the current European patent, and probably substantially more, thanks 
to  higher  fees  and  higher  maintenance  rates.  With  our  preferred  VCOM(200)  or 
VCOM(300) fee structure, the total income generated by one patent would be 150% 
higher than the current total income generated with the European patent. It is quite 
reassuring to reach the conclusion that the total renewal fees’ income generated by a 
patent under the COMPAT could be substantially higher than the current cumulated 
renewal fees’ income generated by a European patent in all NPOs. The key issue is now 
to assess to what extent the COMPAT would actually affect each NPO’s income. This 
obviously depends on the adopted distribution key between NPOs, which is tackled in 
the following section. 
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3  Implications for patent offices 
Five  distribution  keys  can  be  considered  for  the  sharing  of  the  total  renewal  fees’ 
income  generated  under  the  COMPAT;  they  are  presented  in  Table  3,  with  their 
strengths and weaknesses. The actual distribution key (which is the share of each NPO 
in the total income generated by all NPOs) would actually be an unfair distribution, 
because  it  is  highly  biased  in  favor  of  large  countries,  and  especially  Germany. 
Applicants gradually reduce the number of countries for enforcement, and when they 
keep the patent ‘alive’ it is generally in the largest countries. Germany is frequently the 
last  country  in  which  a  patent  is  kept  enforced  (see  van  Pottelsberghe  and  van 
Zeebroeck  (2008)  and  van  Zeebroeck  (2008)).  Thanks  to  its  large  market  Germany 
currently  enjoys  a  large  and  more  than  proportional  share  of  renewal  fees’  income 
generated by the average European patent, about 32%, whereas population, GDP and 
R&D shares in the EU are ‘only’ 17%, 20% and 27%, respectively. 
The ‘council proposal’ weighting scheme21 reflects the outcome of political negotiations 
and is quite complex, as it takes into account the countries’ size, their languages and 
their innovation potentials. It is so complex that it is not easy to compute (especially ten 
years from now, should the criterion used still be the same?), and probably not a good 
communication pitch if the community patent is created. 
The GDP or R&D weighting schemes are for us the simplest, fairest and most effective 
distribution keys. They are very easy to compute and communicate, and actually reward 
countries with a high economic performance, which originates from innovative efforts. 
Catching  up  countries  and  dynamic  economies  would  actually  be  rewarded  by  this 
scheme. An alternative weighting scheme would be related to the population size of 
countries.  This  would  reward  large  countries,  but  not  their  innovation  or  economic 
performances and is therefore less appropriate in our views. 
The relative differences observed between the five weighting schemes for a given level 
of revenue are illustrated in appendix table G. The choice of the distribution key has 
implications  on  the  actual  revenue  sharing  related  to  the  renewal  fees’  income 
generated by the COMPAT. Some countries could lose and others could win, depending 
                                                        
21 As proposed in the European Council working document (EC, 2008) made available by the European 
Commission (DG Internal Market), see Appendix Table F for more details. 24 
 
on the chosen key. Instead of analyzing cross country differences in distribution keys it 
is more relevant to consider the total revenue generated by an average patent, and then 
derive  the  revenue  for  each  NPO,  because  a  distribution  key  might  be  lower  for  a 
country, but the actual revenue higher due to a much higher total revenue generated by 
renewal fees. 
 
Table 3 - PROS and CONS of four alternative distribution keys 
Distribution keys  Assessment 
Actual distribution of NPOs’ renewal fees’ 
income 
Unfair,  large  bias  in  favor  of  large 
countries,  especially  the  largest 
(Germany) 
“Council proposal” weighting scheme  Complex,  not  easy  to  compute  and  to 
communicate,  takes  into  account  the 
linguistic specificities. 
Population weighting scheme  Bias  in  favor  of  large  countries, 
unrelated to innovative efforts, easy to 
compute. 
GDP weighting scheme  Fair, easy to compute and communicate, 
favors  countries  with  a  high  economic 
performance 
R&D weighting scheme  Fair, easy to compute and communicate, 
favors innovative countries 
 
 
This  is  illustrated  in  Table  4  (for  the  VCOM(200+)  renewal  fee  schedule),    and    in 
appendix tables H and I (for the VCOM(200) and VCOM(300) renewal fees schedules, 
respectively), which show the renewal fees’ income generated by an average patent 
under the current European patent system (where the income is generated by each 
NPO) and under the COMPAT, with a distribution key based on alternative weighting 
schemes.  
It clearly appears that with the three renewal fees schedules, most of the NPOs would 
have a higher income with the COMPAT than with the European patent. This is due to 
the much higher total income generated by one patent (cf. Figure 4). Smaller countries 
would actually largely benefit from the COMPAT, because they have a relatively low 
revenue with the current European patent, due to the very low validation rate. 25 
 
Table  4  -  NPO's  renewal  fees  income  under  EP  and  COMPAT  with  the 
VCOM(200+) renewal fee schedule    
   VNPO  Level (€)  Relative net differences (%) 
   €  Proposed  GDP  Population  R&D  Proposed  GDP  Population  R&D 
EPO  5686  7441  7441  7441  7441  31  31  31  31 
Germany  2386  1957  1483  1236  2032  -18  -38  -48  -15 
France  802  819  1155  953  1309  2  44  19  63 
United Kingdom  597  729  1222  915  1175  22  105  53  97 
Netherlands  332  551  345  246  320  66  4  -26  -4 
Austria  227  424  164  125  218  87  -27  -45  -4 
Italy  576  677  946  888  581  18  64  54  1 
Spain  230  454  628  669  408  97  173  190  77 
Sweden  111  260  200  137  405  135  81  23  265 
Denmark  71  193  141  81  187  173  98  14  164 
Belgium  88  201  202  159  206  129  130  81  135 
Ireland  55  104  113  65  80  88  104  17  44 
Finland  70  104  107  80  199  49  52  14  184 
Portugal  31  127  99  159  54  302  216  406  71 
Greece  21  112  136  168  42  424  539  690  98 
Luxembourg  13  37  22  8  19  193  70  -41  53 
Hungary  15  67  58  152  31  ∆  ∆  ∆  ∆ 
Cyprus  10  45  9  12  2  ∆  ∆  ∆  ∆ 
Estonia  5  52  8  20  5  ∆  ∆  ∆  ∆ 
Czech Republic  17  60  73  155  61  ∆  ∆  ∆  ∆ 
Romania  6  89  62  325  15  ∆  ∆  ∆  ∆ 
Slovakia  8  52  28  81  7  ∆  ∆  ∆  ∆ 
Bulgaria  6  60  16  116  4  ∆  ∆  ∆  ∆ 
Slovenia  4  30  20  30  17  ∆  ∆  ∆  ∆ 
Lithuania  1  52  15  51  7  ∆  ∆  ∆  ∆ 
Latvia  0  45  10  35  4  ∆  ∆  ∆  ∆ 
Poland  3  119  174  572  52  ∆  ∆  ∆  ∆ 
Malta  0  37  3  6  1  -  -  -  - 
Note: ∆ represents a large and positive difference due to recent EPC membership and/or small 
size. 
Source:  own  calculation  based  on  total  renewal  fees’  income  presented  in  Figure  5  and  on 
distribution keys presented in Appendix Table G.  
 
Table 4 suggests that with the VCOM(200+) fee structure, the EPO would earn nearly 
€7,500 per patent granted, on average. Germany would have an income that fluctuates 
between €1,240 and €2,000; depending on the adopted distribution key, against an 
current revenue per patent of about €2,400. All other countries would benefit from an 
increase  in  their  revenue  thanks  to  the  COMPAT.  Appendix  Tables  H  and  I  present 
similar figures but with alternative fee schedules (VCOM(200) and VCOM(300)). The 26 
 
conclusions remain the same, except that the revenues are even higher than with the 
VCOM(200+) fee schedule. 
The relative differences between the renewal fees revenues generated by the European 
patent (VNPO) and those generated by the community patent (with VCOM(200+)) are 
presented  in  the  last  three  columns  of  Table  4.  The  relative  differences  with  the 
VCOM(200) and VCOM(300) renewal fees schedules are presented in Appendix Tables 
H and I, respectively. For instance, with the VCOM(200+) and the GDP distribution key, 
only Germany, Austria and Cyprus would have a lower revenue per patent. For Germany 
this is due to the loss of its leading position within the European patent system in terms 
of market size, whereas for Austria this is due to very high national renewal fees that 
generate a higher income than the COMPAT would generate with the VCOM(200+). 
 
4  Implications for relative patenting costs 
The first section underlines two types of failures induced by the currently fragmented 
patent system in Europe. First is the prohibitive cost of patenting, due to the cumulated 
national renewal fees that applicants must pay to keep their patent in force. Second are 
the incongruities generated by a system where national system have the ultimate power 
to  grand  or  unvalidate  a  patent  and  the  high  uncertainty  that  occurs  when  several 
parallell  litigations  take  place.  These  two  types  of  failure  would  vanish  with  the 
COMPAT. 
Figure 6 shows that 10 years of protection with the COMPAT (with the VCOM(200+) fee 
schedule22) would cost about €11,400 against €16,000 nowadays for a protection in 6 
countries and nearly €30,000 for a protection in 13 countries. This must be compared 
with a total cost lower than €4,000 in all other large economic areas. It is worth noticing 
that the translation costs have disappeared for the cost of a COMPAT. This is due to the 
language  arrangements  put  forward  for  the  potential  COMPAT.23  Of  the  €4,600 
                                                        
22 This patenting cost is exactly the same for VCOM(200) renewal fees schedule since this international 
comparison focuses on 10 years of protection. 
23  With the future COMPAT applicants may submit their applications in one of the official languages of 
their EU member state. The costs for the translation of the applications into one of the EPO languages 
will be borne by the system. Translations of the claims and descriptions would be made available upon 
publication of the patent application for the provision of patent information. These translations will be 27 
 
reduction from the protection in 6 countries to the COMPAT, €2,600 comes from the 
drop in translation requirements, €200 is due to the drop in validation fees, and €1,800 
comes from changes in the renewal fees structure. 
 
Figure 6 - International comparison of patenting costs with the COMPAT 
 
Source: van Pottelsberghe and Mejer (2009) and own calculations for the COMPAT figures 
 
These absolute numbers do not account for the market size covered by the patents. 
Doing so would logically put Europe in a much better situation, thanks to its market of 
about  500  million  inhabitants.  Figure  7  shows  that  10  years  of  protection  with  the 
COMPAT (with the VCOM(200+) fee schedule) would cost about €23  per million capita 
(it is close to €28 in Japan), against €55 per million capita nowadays for a protection in 
6 countries and €76 for a protection in 13 countries. In the USA one patent costs only 
€12 per million capita. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
carried out by a specialized central service on demand and will be based upon machine translation 
programs. For granted patents, and in case of litigation, official translations have to be secured by the 
patent holder (see Article 24a, Revised Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Community patent, 
Council Working Document 8588/09). 
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Figure 7 - International comparison of patenting costs per million capita 
 
Source: van Pottelsberghe and Mejer (2009) and own calculations for the COMPAT figures 
 
Finally, accounting for the size of patents (number of claims per patent) leads to less 
biased  comparisons  because  applications  at  the  USPTO  are  much  larger  (about  24 
claims per patent) than their EPO counterparts (about 18 claims per patent).  In Japan 
there are ‘only’ about 10 claims per patent.24 The cost per claim per capita indicator put 
forward by van Pottelsberghe and François (2009) would place Europe (US purchasing 
power parity 1.2) between Japan (1.7) and the USA (0.4). Figure 8 suggests that the 
demand for patents (the millions of claims that were filed) in 2006 seems to be related 
to the relative fees, along a traditional demand curve. 
Existing studies aiming at evaluating the fee elasticity of demand for patents converge 
towards a value of about -0.4 (cf. de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe (2007, 2008, 
2009)). Therefore, the 45% decrease in relative prices due to the implementation of the 
COMPAT  would  induce  an  18%  increase  (illustrated  by  the  star  in Figure  8)  in  the 
demand for patents at the EPO, everything else being equal otherwise.  
 
                                                        
24 See Archontopoulos et al. (2007), van Zeebroeck et al (2009) and de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe 
(2008) for evidence on the evolution of the size of patent applications in the three offices. 
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Figure 8 - Relative patenting costs and the demand for patents
 
Source:  own  calculation  from  data  presented  in  this  paper  and  from  van 
(2009). The cost per claim per million capita is expressed in US PPPs, and includes the cumulated costs 
for up to 10 years of protection.   
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In a nutshell, the COMPAT with a unified jurisdiction would reduce both the costs and 
uncertainty currently associated with the fragmented European patent system, while 
quality  in  the  examination  process  would  be  held  stable  thanks  to  relatively  high 
The beneficial effects of the COMPAT (cost savings, construction 
of the single market, lower complexity) would make the patent system more accessible 
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patent),25 the disappearance of validation fees (€ 200 per patent) and the change in 
renewal fees (as compared to a current protection in six countries, see Figure 5). In 
relative terms, a drop of 45% in the cost per claim per capita (because the market 
protection would jump from about 6 countries to a market of 500 million inhabitants) 
and an increase of about 18% in the demand for patent protection would be observed, 
everything else being equal. This increase in the attractiveness of the European patent 
system  could  generate  additional  new  revenues  for  patent  offices  (on  top  of  the 
simulations above): each patent under the COMPAT would generate more revenue than 
a European patent, and there would be an increase in the number of patent applications. 
But the financial impact goes far beyond the budgetary constraints of patent offices. 
In  his  landmark  “rational  ignorance”  paper,  Mark  Lemley  (2001)  adopted  a  simple 
analytical approach (an arithmetic model) to assess the cost-benefit of improving the 
quality of examination at the US patent office (USPTO). This section relies on a similar 
approach to draw a broad picture of the impact of the COMPAT on the financial flows 
associated with the main actors of the system. Based on the simulations results, it is 
indeed  possible  to assess  the extent  to  which  each  major economic  actor  would  be 
affected by the COMPAT.  
Let us assume that 50,000 patents are granted each year by the EPO under the COMPAT 
and  under  the  current  European  Patent  system.26  The  impact  of  the  COMPAT  can 
therefore be assessed by comparing the situation before (with the current European 
Patents) and after the COMPAT – for each actor. The changes due to the COMPAT are 
illustrated  in  Table  5;  they  include  changes  in  renewal  fees,  translation  costs, 
intermediation costs and litigation costs. 
 
                                                        
25 The language arrangements – which are still on the negotiation table – to reduce costs and complexity 
for applicants are: a central (at the EPO) automated translation into all EU languages at no extra cost for 
applicants, for information purposes only, and with no legal effect; filling in applicant’s own language is 
allowed; and full translation of patent will be paid by the patent owner in case of a legal dispute (see 
Félix, 2009). 
26 This number is taken for the exercise that consists in estimating the total savings and/or losses induced 
by the COMPAT. Remember that all of the simulations are done at the patent level. The total impact 
corresponds to the multiplication of the cost/benefit figures by 50,000. This number could of course be 
smaller (i.e. due to the current financial crisis) or higher (due to the drop in relative costs and the 
improved attractiveness of the Community Patent) but the main message would be exactly the same. 
We are convinced that 50,000 is a conservative hypothesis, because the COMPAT would be much more 
attractive than the current system (in 2008 the EPO granted 59,819 patents). 31 
 
Table 5 - Total impact by type of actors considering 50,000 patents (in € 
millions) 
  
EPO  NPOs  Business 
sector 
Attorn. & 
transl.  Lawyers 
Renewal fees
ε   +88   +88   -176     
Designation fees EPO
α, β  -25    +40  -15   
Validation fees NPOs
χ    -10  +10     
Translation costs
δ  -20    +129  -129   
Filing patent translation
α      +60  -60   
Taking over representation
α      +46  -46   
Intermediary cost for maintenance
α      +20  -20   
Drop in parallel litigation (Harhoff, 
2009)
 φ 
       +121    -121 
Total  +43  +78  +250  -270  -121 
α  Based  on  the  median  cost  corresponding  to  several  patent  attorney’s  fees  (according  to  van 
Pottelsberghe and Mejer (2008), cf. Appendix Table J; ‘designated states’ and ‘filing patent translation’ 
were  assumed  to  disappear  completely  while  two  third  of  ‘taking  over  representation’  and  the 
‘intermediation costs for maintenance‘ were dropped; for the latter, the simulated maintenance rate of 
the COMPAT (VCOM(200+)) was taken into account); 
β €500 paid to EPO for designation of 6 countries; 
χ 
€200 per patent (own calculation, see Figure 5); 
δ €400 per patent for machine translation under EPO’s 
budget and own calculation (see Figure 6); 
ε own calculation (see Figure 5 and Table 4); 
φ The amount 
reported corresponds to the lower bound of the estimates performed by Harhoff (2009). 
 
Thanks to the COMPAT, the sharp reduction of several intermediation costs, patent fees 
and translation expenses wouId more than compensate for the increase in renewal fees 
(due  to  a  higher  maintenance  rate).  First,  on  average,  a  patent  granted  under  the 
COMPAT  would  generate  additional  renewal  fees  of  about  €3,600  more  than  one 
average European patent, which leads – for 50,000 patents – to an additional revenue of 
€88 million for the NPOs and €88 million for EPO(see Table 4). Although this increase 
will  be  paid  by  the  applicants  (the  business sector),  one  must  keep  in  mind  that it 
provides protection for a considerably larger market (cf. Figure 7 for a comparison of 
relative patenting costs, which are significantly lower for the COMPAT than for the EP). 
Second, designation fees at the EPO and validation fees at NPOs would disappear, which 
corresponds to a gain of €500 and €200 (see Figure 5) per patent, respectively. Third, 
there would be a loss for translators corresponding to a cost reduction of about € 2,600 
(see Figure 6) on average per patent. On the other hand the EPO would have to bear the 
cost of processing the translations of incoming applications. This centralized approach, 32 
 
combined with the continuous improvement of machine translations, would probably 
cost a few hundred EURO per patent (say €400). Fourth, patent attorneys would also 
lose their income for interacting with several NPOs. Based on the survey performed by 
van Pottelsberghe and Mejer (2008), we can evaluate this drop in intermediary costs at 
about €2,500 per patent, which is composed of different types of costs (designation, 
filing  patent  translation,  taking  over  representation,  and  intermediary  costs  for 
maintenance). Finally, Harhoff (2009) evaluates the total savings from having a unified 
and integrated European Patent Litigation System and the drop of parallel litigation at 
€148 millions (lower  bound of his estimation) compared to the operating cost of a 
European Court of €27 million, which means a gain for the business sector of €121 
million. In a nutshell, the COMPAT would lead to net savings of €250 million for the 
business sector. The EPO and the NPOs would earn, respectively, €43 million and €78 
million, whereas attorneys and translators would lose €270 million and the drop in 
parallel litigation costs would be of about €121 million. In other words, nearly €400 
million would switch from patent attorneys, translators and lawyers to patent offices 
and the business sector, while the relative cost of a patent would drop by about 45%. 
 
6  Concluding remarks 
This paper essentially aims at evaluating the main economic consequences of setting up 
the Community Patent (COMPAT) within the European Union. First, it simulates the 
renewal fees’ budgetary consequences for the European Patent Office (EPO) and the 
national patent offices (NPOs). Second, it measures the consequences for the business 
sector in terms of absolute and relative fees, and the budgetary impact for the major 
actors of the patent system. 
Besides  the  simulation  exercise,  the  present  paper  contributes  to  the  economic 
literature on the patenting behavior of applicants. An econometric model explaining the 
observed maintenance rates of European patents in 17 countries over the past 20 years 
shows that five main factors play a significant role: the GDP size of a country, the age of 
the patent, the level of renewal fees, the strength of a country’s patent system, and the 
length of time that a country has been a member of the European Patent Convention. 33 
 
The estimated impacts of these five variables allow in turn to derive the maintenance 
rate of the COMPAT and hence the renewal fees income it would generate for patent 
offices. 
The  simulations  show  that  the  EPO  and  most  NPOs  would  actually  gain  from  each 
patent granted under the COMPAT if an ‘appropriate’ fee schedule is adopted. This is 
mainly due to a price effect (higher absolute fees) combined with a size effect (a new 
market for technology of about 500 million inhabitants) which would lead to a longer 
duration of patents. The main office that might see a significant drop in its renewal fees 
income is the German Patent Office, which has historically benefited from its ‘largest 
economy’  status  in  Europe  and  hence  generates  above  the  expected  validation  and 
maintenance rates (Germany is the country where most patents are validated at grant, 
and where they currently remain valid for the longest period of time).  
The  broad  budgetary  or  financial  impact  of the  COMPAT  goes  far  beyond  the  mere 
changes  in  the  renewal  fees’  structure.  The  new  centralized  system  would  sharply 
reduce translation and intermediation costs, and the costs induced by parallel litigations 
with  heterogeneous  outcomes.  Under  the  very  conservative  assumption  of  50,000 
patents being granted each year by the EPO (and the VCOM(200+) renewal fee schedule 
put forward in this paper), the COMPAT would result in total financial surpluses of 
€250 million for the business sector, €43 million for the EPO and €78 million for NPOs, 
compared to total losses of €270 million for patent attorneys and translators and at 
least €121 million for lawyers, due to a sharp fall in parallel litigations. 
This exercise should obviously be taken with a touch of caution, both for its reliance on 
an econometric model that leads to a simulated maintenance rate and its voluntary 
failure to take stock of other positive or negative effects of the COMPAT. It is worth 
noticing that no or very few patent offices had foreseen the sharp drop in revenue due 
to the 2008 crisis, providing evidence of the actual complexity of performing budgetary 
planning in this field. The methodology adopted in the present paper does not grasp the 
whole  set  of  factors  that  might  influence  the  revenue  of  a  patent  office,  especially 
regarding  the  future  quality  of  applications  and/or  granted  patents.  In  addition,  a 34 
 
normative  approach  is  missing.27  We  do  not  tackle  the  question  of  what  kind  of 
community patent would be best for Europe; the simulations were indeed performed 
under the constraints of the current patent system and under the conditions set by 
political negotiations related to fees and translations. One important condition relates 
to  the  50/50  split  between  national  patent  offices  and  the  EPO.  Nothing,  however, 
precludes  the  reader  to  dream  of  an  alternative  redistribution  scheme  of  the  EPO 
‘surplus’.  It  could,  for  instance,  be  used  to  reduce  entry  fees  (renewal  fees  would 
contribute to cover examination costs), or to fund basic research projects in universities 
(igniting a virtuous cycle whereby monopolistic rents would support the creation of 
new ideas), or to further improve the quality and accessibility of patent information, or 
a mix of these three proposals. 
One cannot deny that the COMPAT is implicitly associated with a potential loss of power 
and control by NPOs, a risk which might well be more influential than the budgetary 
surpluses that are to be made through its implementation. Despite a potentially strong 
increase in their revenue, NPOs might still tilt towards anti-COMPAT lobbies. The same 
argument  can  also  be  put  forward  with  the  EPO  under  the  COMPAT  regime,  which 
would sooner or later fall under more stringent control by the European Parliament or 
the European Commission. Would higher revenues compensate for a reduction in its 
‘freedom to operate’? These budget-and-control balances, jointly with the substantial 
financial  losses  of  patent  attorneys,  translators  and  lawyers,  are  key  factors  that 
somewhat elucidate the observed successful resistance to the COMPAT over the past 50 
years.  These  institutions  or  lobbies  benefit  to  a  large  extent  from  the  currently 
fragmented system and from controlling it.  
Despite  the  fact  that  nearly  €400  million  would  switch  from  patent  attorneys, 
translators and lawyers towards patent offices and the business sector, policy makers 
should strategize far beyond a mere budgetary/economic analysis. If innovation is the 
ultimate target, and if one believes in the stimulating role played by patent systems, we 
                                                        
27 For instance, two important issues must still be solved for the COMPAT to start working effectively. The 
first one concerns the design of the Centralized Patent Litigation system, which has not yet been agreed 
upon.  The  second  one  relates  to  the  overconfidence  regarding  the  ability  of  machine  translation 
software to provide sufficiently reliable translations of the claims section of a patent. This automatic 
translation issue  would deserve particular attention in Europe, at least to the same extent that the 
current  heavy  investments  conceded  to  performing  machine  translations  of  Chinese  and  Japanese 
patents in English. 35 
 
must be aware that, in its current set up, the European patent system does not meet its 
own  agenda,  but  rather  the  ones  of  those  who  control  it.  What  matters  first  and 
foremost  is  that  the  COMPAT  would  drastically  simplify  the  system,  reduce  the 
uncertainty currently associated with the fragmented system and make it attractive for 
companies (domestic and foreign), and less incongruous for SMEs and universities; it 
would give some motion to the invisible hand, with undoubtedly large benefits for the 
business sector in general, and high-tech entrepreneurs in particular.  
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APPENDIX TABLE A. MAIN FACTORS EXPLAINING THE FEES-RELATED 
INCOME OF PATENT OFFICES 
  European patent  COMPAT 
- Validation  - Validation rate in each NPO  -  nr 
- Maintenance  - Maintenance rate in each NPO  -  Maintenance rate of COMPAT 
- Fees  - Renewal fees of each NPO  -  Renewal fees of the COMPAT 
-   - nr  -  Distribution key towards NPOs 39 
 
APPENDIX B. MEASUREMENT METHOD FOR MAINTENANCE RATES 
The dependent variable, of the model analyzed in this paper (eq. 4), corresponds to the 
maintenance rate of granted patents ((1-δ), or one minus the drop-out rate) enforced in 
country i at year t (t=6,…, 20). 15 years of renewals are therefore taken into account for 
each  country.  As  it  is  illustrated  in  the  following  tables  (representing  the  cases  of 
Germany and Belgium), these maintenance rates were computed as the share of patents 
still in force at the end of each patent year, the denominator being the total number of 
patent validated in the country. 
APPENDIX TABLE B1.  MAINTENANCE RATES COMPUTATION - GERMANY 
Filing 
year  Grant    Patents still in force at the end of the patent year   
  6  7  8  9  10   
…  …  …  …  …  …  …  …  … 
1996  44663  …  43228  41376  39055  36431  33943  … 
1997  47147  …  45557  43721  41439  39032  36613  … 
1998  49313  …  47336  45470  43266  40931  38658  … 
1999  49466  …  47071  45289  43139  40895  0  … 
2000  50655  …  47724  45753  43609  0  0  … 
2001  45829  …  43114  41373  0  0  0  … 
2002  38298  …  35556  0  0  0  0  … 
…  …  …  …  …  …  …  …  … 
Maintenance rates (%)  94  90  87  83  78  … 
Source : Raw data provided by the EPO and national patent offices, own computation. 
APPENDIX TABLE B2.  MAINTENANCE RATES COMPUTATION - BELGIUM 
Filing 
year  Grant 
Patents still in force at the end of the patent year    
6  7  8  9  10    
…  …  …  …  …  …  …  …  … 
1996  18539  …  14993  12909  10678  8998  7783  … 
1997  19371  …  15534  12917  10678  9158  7982  … 
1998  20553  …  15614  12996  10961  9365  8280  … 
1999  24340  …  16139  13252  10862  9307  0  … 
2000  29909  …  17585  13705  11080  0  0  … 
2001  27972  …  14902  11270  0  0  0  … 
2002  23885  …  10868  0  0  0  0  … 
…  …  …  …  …  …  …  …  … 
Maintenance rates (%)  53  46  45  46  41  … 
Source : Raw data provided by the EPO and national patent offices, own computation. 40 
 
In other words, maintenance rates were measured as the number of patents still in force 
at the end of the patent year divided by the number of patents of the same cohort that 
were validated in the country. It can be noticed that ‘diagonal-1’ data (highlighted in 
grey on the above tables) was preferred because the more recent data seems to be 
biased due to the lack of the most recent information (see appendix Figure D1, this leads 
to a slight increase but it’s base on most recent data). 
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APPENDIX TABLE C. MAINTENANCE RATES AND VALIDATION RATES FOR 
THE ENTIRE DATABASE 
 
Maintenance rates (%)  Validation 
rates (%)     6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20 
Germany  94  90  87  83  78  70  64  57  50  44  39  33  29  24  19  90 
France  90  85  80  75  69  62  55  48  42  37  32  27  25  21  17  78 
United Kingdom  87  82  78  74  69  62  55  49  42  38  33  27  25  21  17  73 
Netherlands  56  51  51  50  46  42  37  33  28  25  22  19  16  14  11  24 
Austria  50  43  42  43  38  34  30  26  22  19  16  14  12  10  8  17 
Italy  75  70  67  64  60  54  49  43  37  33  29  24  24  20  17  48 
Spain  67  59  57  55  49  44  39  34  28  25  22  18  17  14  12  32 
Sweden  52  44  43  43  39  35  31  28  23  20  17  14  13  11  9  19 
Denmark  43  35  33  36  33  30  27  23  19  18  15  13  12  11  9  11 
Belgium  53  46  45  46  41  37  33  29  23  21  18  15  14  12  10  19 
Ireland  47  37  35  40  36  33  29  25  21  19  19  16  13  11  9  11 
Finland  39  31  31  34  31  29  25  24  21  18  16  14  12  11  9  10 
Portugal  46  35  32  34  30  28  25  22  18  16  14  12  11  9  9  8 
Greece  40  30  29  32  28  26  24  21  17  15  12  11  11  9  9  6 
Luxembourg  44  32  27  32  28  26  22  20  15  14  12  11  11  9  9  6 
USA  86  85  85  67  66  65  64  46  44  43  42  -  -  -  -  100 
Japan  100  98  94  91  90  87  83  78  71  65  59  52  47  41  33  100 
The maintenance rate corresponds to the share of patents still in force at the end of the patent year and the 
validation rate is the share of granted EPO patents validated in EPC contracting states in 2006 
Source: data provided by the EPO and national patent offices, own calculation.  
APPENDIX FIGURE D1. MAINTENANCE RATES 
LIFETIME 
Source : Raw data provided by the EPO, own calculation
APPENDIX FIGURE D2. MAINTENANCE RATES OV
LIFETIME 
Source : Raw data provided by the EPO, own calculation
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APPENDIX TABLE E. OTHER VARIABLES IN THE DATABASE 
  GDP (in 
billion €) 
Age of 
membership  IPI 
Renewal Fees (€) 
  6*  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20 
Germany  2322  31  4,50  130  180  240  290  350  470  620  760  910  1060  1230  1410  1590  1760  1940 
France  1807  31  4,67  150  150  150  150  150  300  300  300  300  300  600  600  600  600  600 
United Kingdom  1913  31  4,54  86  111  136  160  185  210  234  259  284  308  333  370  407  444  494 
Netherlands  540  31  4,67  185  220  280  340  400  500  600  700  800  900  1000  1100  1200  1300  1400 
Austria  257  29  4,33  675  270  270  270  500  500  500  850  850  850  1400  1400  1400  1400  1400 
Italy  1480  30  4,67  190  120  170  200  230  310  410  530  600  650  650  650  650  650  650 
Spain  982  22  4,33  328  103  129  154  179  217  255  292  330  368  420  469  520  570  620 
Sweden  313  30  4,54  413  143  169  201  238  238  285  301  322  349  375  402  428  455  476 
Denmark  220  18  4,67  328  215  241  275  308  342  375  409  443  483  523  563  603  644  684 
Belgium  317  31  4,67  85  100  125  145  170  195  220  250  290  330  370  410  455  500  545 
Ireland  177  16  4,67  184  150  176  194  220  242  265  285  311  335  356  382  408  438  468 
Finland  167  12  4,67  465  200  235  265  300  350  400  450  500  535  585  645  705  755  805 
Portugal  155  16  4,38  135  98  114  137  172  201  228  275  321  366  412  458  504  549  595 
Greece  213  22  4,30  370  84  98  114  134  154  184  214  242  272  322  358  392  430  472 
Luxembourg  34  31  4,14  59  74  89  104  118  130  145  160  175  190  205  220  235  250  270 
USA  10496  31  4,88  -  -  -  776  -  -  -  1964  -  -  -  3256  -  -  - 
Japan  3485  31  4,67  88  269  269  269  902  902  902  902  902  902  902  902  902  902  902 
* for European countries, the validation fees (D. Harhoff et al. 2008, p 14) are included in the renewal fees for year 6 
Source: Eurostat, data provided by the EPO and Park (2008), and national patent offices websites, own computation. 44 
 
 
APPENDIX TABLE F. ‘COUNCIL PROPOSAL’ WEIGHTING SCHEME 
    UE27 Dist. key    Language Criteria (1)     Promotion innovation 1stCriterion (2)    Promotion innovation 2ndCriterion (3)    Base Criterion (4)    Total (1+2+3+4) 
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Germany  82,3  94.616  31,6%    Yes  0  0%  0       47.855  581  1  0,3%  24  0,3%    14.274  173,4  1  0,26%  24  0,3%    78.881 
26,3%    78.929  26,3% 
France  63,4  39.200  13,1%    Yes  0  0%  0       15.395  243  8  2,1%  190  2,1%    4.498  71,0  8  2,12%  190  2,1%    32.681 
10,9%    33.062  11,0% 
UK  60,9  34.898  11,6%    Yes  0  0%  0       15.825  260  7  1,9%  167  1,9%    2.254  37,0  11  2,91%  262  2,9%    29.094 
9,7%    29.523  9,8% 
Italy  59,1  25.751  8,6%    No  450  0,15%  4.807  21,4%    9.862  167  12  3,2%  286  3,2%    2.317  39,2  10  2,65%  238  2,6%    21.469  7,2%    27.249  9,1% 
Netherlands  16,4  24.083  8,0%    No  450  0,15%  1.329  5,9%    5.577  341  6  1,6%  143  1,6%    1.919  117,4  5  1,32%  119  1,3%    20.078  6,7%    22.119  7,4% 
Austria  8,3  20.173  6,7%    Yes  0  0%  0       3.171  383  3  0,8%  71  0,8%    656  79,1  7  1,85%  167  1,9%    16.818 
5,6%    17.056  5,7% 
Spain  44,5  16.211  5,4%    No  450  0,15%  3.615  16,1%    3.479  78  14  3,7%  333  3,7%    361  8,1  15  3,97%  357  4,0%    13.515 
4,5%    18.270  6,1% 
Sweden  9,1  10.914  3,6%    No  450  0,15%  741  3,3%    3.241  356  5  1,3%  119  1,3%    1.501  164,8  4  1,06%  95  1,1%    9.099 
3,0%    10.503  3,5% 
Denmark  5,4  7.914  2,6%    No  450  0,15%  442  2,0%    1.979  364  4  1,1%  95  1,1%    507  93,2  6  1,59%  143  1,6%    6.598  2,2%    7.728  2,6% 
Belgium  10,6  7.357  2,5%    No  450  0,15%  860  3,8%    1.338  126  13  3,4%  309  3,4%    561  53,0  9  2,38%  214  2,4%    6.134  2,0%    7.967  2,7% 
Ireland  4,3  4.228  1,4%    Yes  0  0%  0       706  164  11  2,9%  262  2,9%    121  28,1  12  3,17%  286  3,2%    3.525 
1,2%    4.072  1,4% 
Finland  5,3  3.903  1,3%    No  450  0,15%  428  1,9%    2.110  400  2  0,5%  48  0,5%    885  167,9  2  0,53%  48  0,5%    3.254 
1,1%    4.227  1,4% 
Portugal  10,6  3.156  1,1%    No  450  0,15%  861  3,8%    172  16  27  7,1%  642  7,1%    19  1,8  19  5,03%  452  5,0%    2.631  0,9%    5.036  1,7% 
Greece  11,2  2.674  0,9%    No  450  0,15%  908  4,0%    631  56  19  5,0%  452  5,0%    30  2,7  17  4,50%  404  4,5%    2.229  0,7%    4.444  1,5% 
Luxemburg  0,5  1.581  0,5%    Yes  0  0%  0       85  181  9  2,4%  214  2,4%    67  142,6  3  0,79%  71  0,8%    1.318 
0,4%    1.604  0,5% 
Hungary  10,1  671  0,2%    No  450  0,15%  818  3,6%    714  71  15  4,0%  357  4,0%    35  3,5  16  4,23%  381  4,2%    559 
0,2%    2.565  0,9% 
Cyprus  0,8  503  0,2%    No  450  0,15%  63  0,3%    31  40  21  5,6%  500  5,6%    15  19,5  13  3,44%  309  3,4%    419 
0,1%    1.741  0,6% 
Estonia  1,3  365  0,1%    No  450  0,15%  109  0,5%    24  18  26  6,9%  619  6,9%    2  1,5  20  5,29%  476  5,3%    304  0,1%    1.957  0,7% 
Czech Republic  10,3  323  0,1%    No  450  0,15%  836  3,7%    597  58  18  4,8%  428  4,8%    21  2,0  18  4,76%  428  4,8%    269  0,1%    2.411  0,8% 
Romania  21,6  309  0,1%    No  450  0,15%  1.753  7,8%    941  44  22  5,8%  523  5,8%    0  0,0  27  7,14%  642  7,1%    258 
0,1%    3.626  1,2% 
Slovakia  5,4  245  0,1%    No  450  0,15%  438  2,0%    156  29  24  6,3%  571  6,3%    8  1,5  21  5,56%  500  5,6%    204 
0,1%    2.163  0,7% 
Bulgaria  7,7  223  0,1%    No  450  0,15%  624  2,8%    268  35  23  6,1%  547  6,1%    4  0,5  23  6,08%  547  6,1%    186  0,1%    2.354  0,8% 
Slovenia  2,0  179  0,1%    No  450  0,15%  163  0,7%    371  185  10  2,6%  238  2,6%    21  10,4  14  3,70%  333  3,7%    149  0,0%    1.333  0,4% 
Lithuania  3,4  76  0,0%    No  450  0,15%  275  1,2%    71  21  25  6,6%  595  6,6%    0  0,0  26  6,88%  619  6,9%    63 
0,0%    2.001  0,7% 
Latvia  2,3  74  0,0%    No  450  0,15%  185  0,8%    117  51  20  5,3%  476  5,3%    2  0,9  22  5,82%  523  5,8%    62 
0,0%    1.696  0,6% 
Poland  38,1  157  0,1%    No  450  0,15%  3.099  13,8%    2.286  60  17  4,5%  404  4,5%    17  0,4  24  6,35%  571  6,3%    131 
0,0%    4.655  1,6% 
Malta  0,4  9  0,0%    No  450  0,15%  33  0,1%    26  65  16  4,2%  381  4,2%    0  0,0  25  6,61%  595  6,6%    8  0,0%    1.465  0,5% 
Total UE27  495,0  299.793  100%       9.443  3,2%  22.425  7,5%    117.028  4.393      8.994  3,0%    30.095        8.994  3,0%    249.937  83,4%    299.755  100% 
Source: European Commission (DG Internal Market, doc 8928/08) 45 
 
APPENDIX TABLE G. FOUR POTENTIAL 'DISTRIBUTION KEYS' 
  Actual*  Proposed*  GDP**  Population*  R&D** 
Germany  31.6%  26.3%  19.9%  16.6%  27.3% 
France  13.1%  11.0%  15.5%  12.8%  17.6% 
United Kingdom  11.6%  9.8%  16.4%  12.3%  15.8% 
Netherlands  8.0%  7.4%  4.6%  3.3%  4.3% 
Austria  6.7%  5.7%  2.2%  1.7%  2.9% 
Italy  8.6%  9.1%  12.7%  11.9%  7.8% 
Spain  5.4%  6.1%  8.4%  9.0%  5.5% 
Sweden  3.6%  3.5%  2.7%  1.8%  5.4% 
Denmark  2.6%  2.6%  1.9%  1.1%  2.5% 
Belgium  2.5%  2.7%  2.7%  2.1%  2.8% 
Ireland  1.4%  1.4%  1.5%  0.9%  1.1% 
Finland  1.3%  1.4%  1.4%  1.1%  2.7% 
Portugal  1.1%  1.7%  1.3%  2.1%  0.7% 
Greece  0.9%  1.5%  1.8%  2.3%  0.6% 
Luxembourg  0.5%  0.5%  0.3%  0.1%  0.3% 
Hungary  0.2%  0.9%  0.8%  2.0%  0.4% 
Cyprus  0.2%  0.6%  0.1%  0.2%  0.0% 
Estonia  0.1%  0.7%  0.1%  0.3%  0.1% 
Czech Republic  0.1%  0.8%  1.0%  2.1%  0.8% 
Romania  0.1%  1.2%  0.8%  4.4%  0.2% 
Slovakia  0.1%  0.7%  0.4%  1.1%  0.1% 
Bulgaria  0.1%  0.8%  0.2%  1.6%  0.1% 
Slovenia  0.1%  0.4%  0.3%  0.4%  0.2% 
Lithuania  0.0%  0.7%  0.2%  0.7%  0.1% 
Latvia  0.0%  0.6%  0.1%  0.5%  0.1% 
Poland  0.1%  1.6%  2.3%  7.7%  0.7% 
Malta  0.0%  0.5%  0.0%  0.1%  0.0% 
Source: * Appendix Table F., ** Eurostat 2006 (million €), and own computation. These four alternative 
distribution  keys  could  be  used  to  redistribute  the  revenues  generated  by  the  COMPAT  renewal  fees 
towards the national patent offices. 46 
 
APPENDIX TABLE H. NPO'S RENEWAL FEES INCOME UNDER EP AND COMPAT 
WITH THE VCOM(200) RENEWAL FEE SCHEDULE 
   VNPO  Level (€)  Relative net differences (%) 
   €  Proposed  GDP  Population  R&D  Proposed  GDP  Population  R&D 
EPO  5686  7916  7916  7916  7916  39  39  39  39 
Germany  2386  2082  1578  1315  2162  -13  -34  -45  -9 
France  802  871  1229  1013  1392  9  53  26  74 
United Kingdom  597  776  1300  973  1250  30  118  63  110 
Netherlands  332  586  367  262  340  77  11  -21  2 
Austria  227  451  175  133  232  99  -23  -42  2 
Italy  576  720  1006  945  618  25  75  64  7 
Spain  230  483  668  711  434  110  190  209  88 
Sweden  111  277  213  145  430  150  92  31  288 
Denmark  71  206  150  86  199  190  111  22  180 
Belgium  88  214  215  169  219  143  145  93  150 
Ireland  55  111  121  69  85  100  117  24  53 
Finland  70  111  114  85  212  58  62  21  202 
Portugal  31  135  106  169  57  327  236  438  82 
Greece  21  119  145  179  45  457  580  740  111 
Luxembourg  13  40  23  8  21  211  81  -37  63 
Hungary  15  71  61  161  33  ∆  ∆  ∆  ∆ 
Cyprus  10  47  10  13  2  ∆  ∆  ∆  ∆ 
Estonia  5  55  9  21  6  ∆  ∆  ∆  ∆ 
Czech Republic  17  63  77  165  65  ∆  ∆  ∆  ∆ 
Romania  6  95  66  345  16  ∆  ∆  ∆  ∆ 
Slovakia  8  55  30  86  8  ∆  ∆  ∆  ∆ 
Bulgaria  6  63  17  123  4  ∆  ∆  ∆  ∆ 
Slovenia  4  32  21  32  18  ∆  ∆  ∆  ∆ 
Lithuania  1  55  16  54  7  ∆  ∆  ∆  ∆ 
Latvia  0  47  11  37  4  ∆  ∆  ∆  ∆ 
Poland  3  127  185  609  56  ∆  ∆  ∆  ∆ 
Malta  0  40  3  6  1  -  -  -  - 
Note: ∆ represents a large and positive difference due to recent EPC membership and/or small 
size. 
Source:  own  calculation  based  on  total  renewal  fees’  income  presented  in  Figure  5  and  on 
distribution keys presented in Appendix Table G.  
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APPENDIX TABLE I. NPO'S RENEWAL FEES INCOME UNDER EP AND COMPAT 
WITH THE VCOM(300) RENEWAL FEE SCHEDULE 
   VNPO  Level  Relative net differences (%) 
   €  Proposed  GDP  Population  R&D  Proposed  GDP  Population  R&D 
EPO  5686  8274  8274  8274  8274  46  46  46  46 
Germany  2386  2176  1649  1375  2260  -9  -31  -42  -5 
France  802  910  1284  1059  1455  14  60  32  81 
United Kingdom  597  811  1359  1017  1306  36  128  71  119 
Netherlands  332  612  384  274  355  85  16  -17  7 
Austria  227  472  183  139  243  108  -19  -39  7 
Italy  576  753  1052  987  646  31  83  71  12 
Spain  230  505  698  743  454  119  203  223  97 
Sweden  111  290  223  152  450  161  101  37  306 
Denmark  71  215  156  90  208  203  120  27  193 
Belgium  88  223  225  177  229  154  156  102  161 
Ireland  55  116  126  72  89  109  127  30  60 
Finland  70  116  119  89  221  65  69  26  216 
Portugal  31  141  110  177  60  347  251  462  90 
Greece  21  124  151  187  47  482  611  778  120 
Luxembourg  13  41  24  8  22  225  89  -34  70 
Hungary  15  74  64  169  35  ∆  ∆  ∆  ∆ 
Cyprus  10  50  10  13  2  ∆  ∆  ∆  ∆ 
Estonia  5  58  9  22  6  ∆  ∆  ∆  ∆ 
Czech Republic  17  66  81  172  68  ∆  ∆  ∆  ∆ 
Romania  6  99  69  361  17  ∆  ∆  ∆  ∆ 
Slovakia  8  58  32  90  8  ∆  ∆  ∆  ∆ 
Bulgaria  6  66  18  129  5  ∆  ∆  ∆  ∆ 
Slovenia  4  33  22  33  19  ∆  ∆  ∆  ∆ 
Lithuania  1  58  17  57  7  ∆  ∆  ∆  ∆ 
Latvia  0  50  11  38  4  ∆  ∆  ∆  ∆ 
Poland  3  132  193  636  58  ∆  ∆  ∆  ∆ 
Malta  0  41  4  7  1  -  -  -  - 
Note: ∆ represents a large and positive difference due to recent EPC membership and/or small 
size. 
Source:  own  calculation  based  on  total  renewal  fees’  income  presented  in  Figure  5  and  on 
distribution keys presented in Appendix Table G.  
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APPENDIX TABLE J. VALUE OF EXTERNAL (PATENT ATTORNEYS) EXPENSES 
ASSOCIATED WITH A PATENT APPLICATION, ITS PROSECUTION AND ITS 
VALIDATION AND MAINTENANCE IN SIX COUNTRIES, AS OF AUGUST 2008 
 
   Average  Median  Min  Max 
PRE-FILING 
Prior art search and draft  8,125  8,125  5,000  11,250 
PROCEDURAL (up to grant) 
Designation states  363  300  190  520 
Representation     2,325      2,200     1,740     3,500   
 + 10h of attorney's work  5,056  5,000  4,240  6,000 
 + 20h of attorney's work  7,556  7,500  6,740  8,500 
POST-GRANT 
Taking over representation     1,884      1,380         840     3,600   
Filing patent translation     1,275      1,200         900     1,800   
Maintenance (6th-10th year)  2,560  2,520  2,400  2,880 
The cost of translation is not accounted for, as it constitutes a separate cost category in our analysis..  
Source: van Pottelsberghe and Mejer (2009), from raw data provided by 11 patent law firms. 